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Abstract
We propose a model of discrimination in the market for mortgages. The model explains
accepted loan applications and determines loan sizes and interest rates simultaneously. A
competitive, and a discriminating monopoly version of the model are proposed. Offered
interest rates and loan sizes are a function of observable borrower characteristics. The
competitive model rests on a marginal condition, re°ecting contract optimality, to which a
zero-profit condition is added. In contrast, the discriminating monopoly maximizes
profitsunder a borrower participation constraint, reflecting the availability of a rental market
as an outside option. Each version of the model is a bivariate, nonlinear model, and is
estimated by standard maximum likelihood methods. The data used for estimation is a sample
of clients of a French network of mortgage lenders. We show the presence of "social
discrimination" in the data, the loan conditions depending, not only on the borrower's wage
and downpayment, but also on the borrower's occupational status. Abnormally high risk
premia in the competitive version of the model suggest the presence of market power,
justifying an attempt at estimating its monopolistic version. The discriminating monopoly
model estimates show that the borrowers' price-elasticity of demand for housing varies with
occupational status, and is inversely related with the lender's interest rate markups. This
confirms that the lender exploits structural differences in the preferences to discriminate, as
predicted by standard theories.
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errors.1. Introduction
To the best of our knowledge, a handful of contributions only have attempted to estimate
a structural econometric model of price discrimination, and none have studied the related
phenomenon of interest rate discrimination, which can be viewed as a particular case, with
such methods1. In the present paper, we propose a structural econometric model of a
market for mortgages, and estimate it on micro-data.
The model determines interest rates and loan sizes simultaneously as a function of
observable borrower characteristics. It can thus be viewed as describing a case of ¯rst-
degree price discrimination in which the lender imposes di®ering price-quantity pairs to
di®erent types of borrowers. In addition, our data set shows that the lender exerts a form
of market power. We have therefore speci¯ed and estimated two versions of the model, a
competitive, and a discriminating monopoly version.
The competitive variant of our model rests on the idea of "competition in contracts":
in equilibrium, any additional entry of a lender with loan o®ers cannot at the same time
attract borrowers and make strictly positive pro¯ts. Two equations then describe the
equilibrium: the ¯rst is a zero-pro¯t condition; the second is a necessary condition for
contract optimality, expressing the e±ciency of trading between lenders and borrowers.
These two equations, once solved, give the amount lent and the interest rate charged
as a function of borrower characteristics. The discriminating monopoly variant of the
model rests on the idea of surplus-extraction by a monopolist: the lender maximizes pro¯t
subject to the participation constraint of borrowers. Each borrower has an outside option,
which is to rent a house instead of buying one. The surplus-extraction or zero-surplus
equation says that in monopolistic equilibrium, borrowers are indi®erent between renting
a house or accepting a mortgage contract o®ered by the lender. A second equation is a
necessary condition for contract optimality, as in the competitive version. This is consistent
with the classic result that a ¯rst-degree discriminating monopoly will propose e±cient
trades. These two equations determine again the loan size and interest rate as a function
of borrower characteristics.
These assumptions give rise to nonlinear, bivariate econometric models which are
estimated by standard maximum likelihood methods. The estimated risk-premia applied
to borrowers in the competitive version are much to high to be reasonable. This indicates
the presence of market power, because the estimated risk-premia are, in fact, interest-rate
markups imposed on borrowers. The discriminating monopoly version of the model, in
spite of its added complexity, gives much more reasonable estimated values of the risk-
premium function.
We also ¯nd that the amount lent and the interest rate charged signi¯cantly vary with
the borrower's income and downpayment. There is a clear indication that di®erences in
treatment depend on the occupational status of borrowers: for instance, executives will
pay less to reimburse their loans than blue collar workers, everything else being equal.
More precisely, the mere fact of being indenti¯ed as an executive by the lender would
1 In contrast, there is an important strand of empirical literature on racial discrimination in mortgage lending
in the U.S., which is discussed below.
2result in better loan conditions, even if the executive's income was in the range of a blue-
collar worker's wage. Estimations also show that categories of borrowers have signi¯cantly
di®erent preference parameters, and these di®erences are exploited by the monopolist,
as suggested by standard theory. For instance, workers have a smaller price-elasticity of
demand for housing than executives. The borrower's price-elasticity of demand is inversely
related with the interest-rate markup charged by the lender.
To the best of our knowledge, this type of nonlinear, structural approach had not been
attempted before, and the estimations obtained show that the approach could be improved
to exploit richer data sets, in other countries. We also think that our model could easily
b ea d a p t e dt ot e s tf o rt h ep r e s e n c eo fr a c i a ld i s c r i m i n a t i o ni nm o r t g a g el e n d i n g ,i nt h e
U.S. (see the discussion in the next to last section of this paper).
Recent structural econometric approaches to nonlinear pricing or price discrimina-
tion include the pionneering work of Ivaldi and Martimort (1994), using data on energy
provision to French dairy producers, and Bousquet and Ivaldi (1997), on telephone pric-
ing. Third-degree price discrimination on the European car market has been studied by
Goldberg and Verboven (2001). Clerydes (2001) uses data on book sales to study discrim-
inatory pricing of paperbacks and hardcovers. Leslie (2001) studies price discrimination
in the sales of tickets for a Broadway show. Cohen (2000) shows that in the U.S paper
towel market, package sizes are used to price discriminate. McManus (2001) tests for the
presence of second-degree discrimination, and therefore product design distortions, in the
price-quality menus o®ered by co®ee shops surrounding the University of Virginia. Mi-
ravete (2001) studies nonlinear tari®s and consumer choice in a menu of optional calling
plans proposed by the Bell telephone company in Kentucky. Finally, Verboven (2002) uses
di®ering driver preferences for gasoline and Diesel cars in Europe to estimate the extent
of price discrimination by manufacturers. Many of the above quoted studies use a form of
discrete choice model of product di®erentiation to represent the behaviour of heterogeneous
consumers2.
Relationships with the theoretical literature on price discrimination and credit rationing
The theoretical literature on credit and banking has emphasized screening under adverse se-
lection, proposing a theory which has the same formal structure as Rothschild and Stiglitz's
(1976) model of competitive insurance markets. Among contributions to this topic, see
Milde and Riley (1988), in which loan size is used as a screening instrument, and Bester
(1985), establishing that collateral is a screening instrument, under asymmetric informa-
tion. Calem and Stutzer (1995) have addressed the problem of racial discrimination with
a theoretical screening model in which the probability of rejection of mortgage loan ap-
plications is used as a screening device: clients choose in a menu of contracts in which
higher interest rates are traded o® against higher probabilities of acceptance. This idea
cannot be applied in the following, since we use data on accepted loan ¯les only. Our
theoretical model aims at modelling loans conditionally on acceptance. Brueckner (1994),
and Stanton and Wallace (1998) address the delicate problem of informational asymme-
tries about lender mobility, and the associated risks of premature repayment and mortgage
2 On the theory of discrete choice models and its application to oligopoly theory, see Anderson et al. (1992).
3renegotiation. They construct a separating equilibrium in which borrowers with di®ering
mobility select ¯xed rate mortgages with di®erent combinations of rates and points3.T h i s
approach, which provides a good explanation for some of the observed mortgage "menus"
in the United States, cannot be applied here, because the lender does not make use of
points in our data set. It is also quite certain that the french provincial housing markets
are characterized by much less mobility than the U.S. markets (this is an important cultural
di®erence between the two countries which has not been studied, as far as we know). It fol-
lows that the interest-rate risk generated by prepayment on loans is apparently negligible
in France, at least as a ¯rst approximation.
In the theoretical model of Brueckner (2000), borrowers self-select by choosing di®er-
ent initial loan-to-value ratios, high interest rates being associated with high LTV, and the
unobservable borrower characteristic driving self-selection is the level of personal default
costs. But Brueckner's model is a re¯nement of the typically American strategic default
or default-option theory, which is not applicable to French data, because the French bor-
rower's liability is not limited to the value of his (her) house. The initial LTV ratio (in
fact, the related "downpayment ratio") plays a role in our empirical analysis; it has a
statistically signi¯cant e®ect as an argument of our estimated risk-premium function. We
¯nd that the risk-premium is a decreasing function of the downpayment ratio. But this
could simply be the mechanical result of a better collateralization of the loan. The model
presented below maps the downpayment, the income, and other exogenous characteristics
of borrowers into (interest-rate, loan size) pairs, and the LTV ratio is endogenous.
To sum up, our French lenders, which are certainly somewhat old-fashioned, as com-
pared to US professionals, are also working in a di®erent legal environment, and do not
o®er choices in a "menu of contracts" to their clients. This is an important reason for
modelling our lender as a ¯rst-degree discriminating monopolist: given our data set, there
are no banking practices, and no compelling dimensions of both the borrower characteristic
and the credit contract spaces along which to construct a reasonable model of self-selection
or second-degree discrimination.
At this point, it should be noted that none of the structural econometric approaches of
price discrimination quoted above went as far as to use a condition expressing that product
quality ranges maximize pro¯t to help identify their model's parameters: this range is
exogenously given. It is di±cult to capture taste heterogeneity in a model of demand for
di®erentiated products and to derive a measure of the extent of price discrimination or
product-quality distortions, and the assumption that a producer's product line is optimal
does not seem to have been tested or used as an identi¯cation restriction in the literature.
Given this di±culty, a contribution of the present paper consists in the use of assumptions
on the seller's pro¯t-maximizing behaviour (i.e., our surplus-extraction equation) to help
identify structural parameters in a price-discrimination problem.
Another di±culty, pointed out by recent theoretical work, is that a realistic model of
second-degree discrimination would be likely to entail several dimensions of uncertainty
about the borrower's characteristics. For instance, at least two dimensions: the borrower's
3 The idea of separation by mobility, when borrowers are better informed than lenders about their probability
of moving, has been ¯rst modelled by Chari and Jagannathan (1989), but in a model in which the interest rate
is constant.
4marginal willingness to pay for a larger loan and a parameter determining the utility level
of his (her) outside option on the housing market. A good model would also probably in-
volve several screening instruments: loan size, loan life, downpayment, points, prepayment
penalties, are possible such instruments. Thus, a multidimensional discrimination model
would be required, as studied in the work Rochet and Chon¶ e (1998). This is known to
lead | apart from hard technical problems | to much less separation of consumer types,
and thus much less discrimination power than in the classic, one-dimensional model. Ro-
chet and Chon¶ e (1998) show that bunching is a robust feature of optimal solutions in the
multidimensional screening problem. The optimal solution cannot be explicitly computed
in general, and with the exception of Armstrong (1999), not much has been published on
the approximation of the optimal discrimination policy by simple pricing rules. A con-
sensus on the form of the appropriate model has not yet emerged. Our approach, which
is to model data as if they re°ected ¯rst-degree discrimination, based on observed client
characteristics, is therefore justi¯ed, at least as a ¯rst step.
In the following, section 2 is devoted to a description of the data and to the results of
a preliminary linear econometric investigation. Section 3 presents the two versions of the
model and section 4 their econometric estimations. Section 5 is devoted to a discussion of




We obtained a sample of observations on the clients of a French mortgage lender, the
Cr¶ edit Hypoth¶ ecaire de France (a nickname), hereafter CHF. The CHF is in fact a net-
work of building societies, scatterred on the French territory, the BSs. These local BSs
have independent application screening and interest rate policies; they own in common a
¯nancial institution, which borrows money on national and international bond markets,
and provides funds to the BSs. The CHF is a prudent and pro¯table institution, with a
long history and a solid reputation. The BSs do not securitize their loans. Rating agencies
have granted a very high note (AA+) to the CHF, so that the institution's cost of funds is
well approximated by, and closely parallels, the long-term rate on French state bonds (the
"OAT" rate), with an almost constant di®erence of a few base points. Although the CHF
has a special legal status, it is fair to describe the behavior of the local BSs as pro¯t max-
imization. Until 1995, when the French government reformed its housing policy, the CHF
had the privilege of distributing a particular kind of state subsidized home loans. This
privilege has disappeared today, since all commercial banks can now initiate the same sub-
sidized loans, but the CHF network has developed a strong expertise in mortgage lending
to the working class, and a goodwill in accordance with this specialization. Its clientele
is composed of a vast majority of modest income employees and workers. It is likely that
many of the CHF clients would see their applications rejected elsewhere.
On top of distributing state subsidized loans, the characteristics of which are tightly
regulated, the CHF also supplys the so-called "free loans", which are unregulated, ordinary
mortgages. Until recently, the vast majority of these mortgages have been classic, ¯xed
5rate, ¯xed repayment mortgages. The French mortgage law is in a sense simpler than
the U.S. legal environment, since the borrowers' liability is not limited to the value of
the house (lenders can pursue other borrower assets to mitigate default-related losses). In
addition, house prices have not decreased very much in the provincial regions, which are
the geographical origin of the sampled borrowers, during the observation period. It follows
that strategic default (or the exercise of the default option) is not empirically relevant in
the sample. In practice, mortgage defaults seem to be triggered by consumer insolvency,
mostly due to loss of income. A form of unemployment insurance of mortgage loans does
indeed exist, but it is not compulsory, it is expensive, and limited in scope. Informational
asymmetries and moral hazard provide an explanation for the weakness of unemployment
insurance of mortgages in France (on this topic, see Chiappori and Pinquet (1999)). These
loans can in principle be renegotiated, the prepayment penalty being in all BSs around 3%
of the principal's remaining value.
For the econometric investigations below, we have used a sample of 2610 observations
on accepted free loans, originated from various BSs across France between 1989 and 1994.
We have eliminated the subsidized loans. There is no information on rejected applications,
and no observations of default or of repayment "incidents".
Each observation corresponds to a ¯le, including, 1o) the amount of the loan, 2o)t h e
loan interest rate (including insurance), 3o) the downpayment (savings used to buy the
house by the borrower), 4o) the starting year, 5o)t h el o a nt e r m ,6 o) the borrower's yearly
wage, 7o) the age of the borrower, 8o) the family size, 9o) the borrower's occupational
status, falling into 6 categories, and 10o) the geographical location of the BS granting the
loan. We kept only four of the occupational status categories, the blue-collar workers (1180
observations), the white-collar employees (908 observations), the so-called intermediate
professions (363 observations), and the executives (159 observations). We also do not use
the geographical location variable in the estimations, and all regions have been pooled.
The model presented below has been constructed to be estimated with this limited
set of information. It can of course easily be adapted to use more explanatory variables.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the data. The amounts lent are not very
high. The downpayment ratios, that is, (downpayment / loan + downpayment) are small,
around 17%. The loan terms are distributed between 1 year and 20 years (the empirical
distribution of loan terms is depicted on Figure 9). The nominal interest rates are very
high with a mean value of 11,7%, but the real interest rates where also very high at the
beginning of the nineties in France, the in°ation rate being already quite low around 2%
per year. The interesting aspect of the data is the substantial variance of the loan rates.
This will allow the estimation of a risk-premium function, and of an interest-rate elasticity
of the demand for housing, in spite of the fact that the observation period is short. Another
striking fact is the markup on state bond rates, which is equal to 3% in the average. The
lenders seem to exert a form of market power.
2.2. An exploratory linear model
To gain some understanding of our data set's content, we have estimated a simple si-
multaneous equation model, explaining loan sizes and rates. More precisely, we started
from the point of view that the relevant endogenous variable for this study is not the
6interest rate itself, but the constant repayment annuity, denoted p, and de¯ned as follows.
A household who borrows for T years at continuous-time rate r,w i l lr e p a yt h ea m o u n t ,
p(r;T)=r=(1 ¡ e¡rT) at each instant of time to reimburse the loan completely, interest
and principal, per euro borrowed (see below, subsection 3.1). The discrete-time equivalent
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1+¹ r)T ;
where ¹ r = er ¡ 1 is the annual interest rate. If i denotes the lender's cost of funds, de¯ne
C = P(i;T). This is a measure of the lender's cost, which is commensurate with P.I f
borrowers are liquidity-constrained, P is a relevant endogenous variable, otherwise, the
interest rate r would be the only important variable (on liquidity constraints, see Deaton
(1992)). Let then m denote the amount lent and a the household's downpayment, so that
H = m+a is the value of the house. Let ¯nally w denote the household's yearly wage, and
n the family size. Using the subset of 1180 unregulated loans granted to blue-collar workers


























Equations A and B have been estimated with the 3SLS method, to take care of simultaneity
problems. The Student t-ratios are in parentheses. The adjusted R2 is :42 for equation A
and :77 for equation B; the estimated correlation of A and B's error terms is :244.
Note that a=H,t h edownpayment ratio, has a signi¯cant negative impact on P,a n d
thus on the loan rate, as expected. But the striking fact is merely the signi¯cance of log(P)
in equation A, which determines house value. The coe±cient on log(P) can be interpreted
(with precautions) as a form of price-elasticity of housing demand. We estimated the same
model separately with the subsets of white collar employees, intermediate professions, and
executives; the 3SLS estimated values of the coe±cient on log(P)a r e¡1:347 for white
collars, ¡1:629 for intermediates, and ¡1:648 for executives, all highly signi¯cant. These
¯ndings suggest that the price-elasticity of house size varies with occupational status and
even seems to increase (in absolute value) with the level in the social hierarchy. In the
following, we try to provide an explanation for this phenomenon, and to relate it with
observed interest-rate markups.
73. A model of mortgage lending
To describe the model, we ¯rst de¯ne the demand side, developing a continuous-time model
of an expected utility maximizing, in¯nitely-lived and liquidity-constrained consumer-
borrower. We then turn to the banking ¯rm's pro¯t function. This preliminary mod-
elling work allows the presentation of two variants of the theory, corresponding to two
assumptions relative to competition on mortgage lending markets: a competitive, and a
monopolistic variant.
3.1. The borrowers
Let ® denote a household's vector of characteristics. Each household of type ® is repre-
sented by an in¯nitely-lived, expected-utility maximizing consumer. The instantaneous
utility of consumer ®, denoted u,i sd e ¯ n e do nt h es e to fb u n d l e s( c;h), where c is in-
stantaneous aggregate consumption and h is housing, measured in constant-quality square
meters. To sum up, u = u(c;h;®). Time t varies continuously, and it is assumed that





where ± is a positive discount factor. Now, each consumer is subject to a liquidity constraint
of an extreme form: she cannot borrow against future income, and can only obtain a
home loan, with the entire house as a collateral. For simplicity, it is assumed that each
consumer is a worker with a constant wage w. Yet, the worker is subject to a risk of
default, which can be interpreted as loss of income, or as a layo®. To this, we add the
rather simplifying assumption (with a European °avor), that once layed o®, the worker
remains unemployed forever. Default (or unemployment) randomly occurs at time t¤.T h e
probability of defaulting between time 0 (the starting point of the loan here) and time t is
assumed exponential and its cumulative distribution function is denoted F,t h a ti s ,
F(t¤ · t)=1¡ e¡µt; (2)
where µ is a nonnegative parameter. The density of F is f(t)=µe¡µt. The only event
triggering mortgage defaults is unemployment, and it implies a complete loss of the house,
due to mortgage foreclosure by the bank, for the sake of simplicity.
We consider classical, ¯xed interest, direct mortgage loans, with constant repayment
(or self-amortizing annuities). Mortgage loans are characterized by an amount lent m,a
¯xed (continuous-time) interest rate r,at e r mT,a n das t a r t i n gd a t eT¤;t h e yc a nb e
described by the array (r;m;T;T ¤). The borrower is endowed with a downpayment a;t h i s
represents money that has been accumulated in the past, and is assumed entirely invested
in the purchase of the house. The consumer rents a house if he or she does not borrow to
buy one, and the accumulated sum of money a is then deposited in some bank and yields
an interest i0. To simplify the model, we assume that i0 = 0 in the following.
8Now, if the house price per square meter is denoted ¼, then the house size (or housing





We de¯ne the downpayment ratio of a consumer as a=(m + a).
The continuous-time constant amortizing repayment of a m e u r o sl o a no ft e r mT,





Straightforward integration then yields,
p(r;T)=
r
1 ¡ e¡rT : (4)
For convenience, we call p(r;T)t h eprice of the loan, and denote it simply by p. Note
that all continuous-time variables can easily be transformed into their discrete-time coun-
terparts, with the appropriate formulas.4
Then, because of the assumed liquidity constraint, the borrower faces a budget con-
straint at each time t. Taking consumption as a numeraire, the budget constraint has the
simple form,
c = w ¡ pm: (5)
De¯nitions (3) and (5) show that, given w, a and ¼, there is a one-to-one relationship
between (p;m)a n d( c;h). Given T, the interest rate r can be retrieved from p by inverting
(4). It follows from this that a mortgage (r;m; T; T ¤) is equivalently characterized by the
vector (c;h;T;T¤), given w, a and ¼. In the following, it will be more convenient to reason
in the (c;h) consumption-bundle plane, instead of the (r;m)p l a n e .
The expected utility of a borrower
We de¯ne di®erent levels of instantaneous utility as follows.
1o) When consumer ® repays a mortgage with price p and enjoys a house of size h,
her utility level writes u = u(w ¡ pm;h;®).
2o) If the consumer defaults, she loses her income and her house. In this case, her
utility level is assumed to be independent of p and h;i ti sd e n o t e du = u0(®).
3o) If the consumer never defaulted, and has completely repaid the loan, then u =
u(w;h;®).
4o) If the consumer loses her income after the loan is completely repayed, she does
not lose her house, and u = u(0;h;®).
5o) Finally, the consumer can rent a house. Let ½ denote the rent per square meter.
If the consumer rents, she will choose (c;h) ¸ 0s oa st om a x i m i z eu(c;h;®)s u b j e c tt ot h e
4 For instance, ifT is expressed in years, and ^ r denotes the annual interest rate, then r=l o g ( 1 + ^ r).
9constraint c + ½h = w. The solution of this standard maximization problem is the pair of
demand functions (c¤(½;w;®);h ¤(½;w;®)). The instantaneous indirect utility of a renter
is thus de¯ned as follows,
vr(½;w;®)=u[c¤(½;w;®);h ¤(½;w;®);®]: (6)
Let now v(t;t¤;T¤;T;®) denote the instantaneous utility of a consumer of type ® at
time t, given that default occurs at time t¤, under a mortgage contract (r;m;T;T ¤). The
expression for v can be computed with the utility levels de¯ned above, since by assumption,
t h ec o n s u m e rr e n t sh e rh o u s ef r o mt =0u n t i lT¤, loses her income at t¤,a n dl o s e sh e r
house at t¤ if T¤ <t ¤ <T+T¤. We can now de¯ne the discounted sum of utilities for the





Using the assumption that the date of default is exponentially distributed, we de¯ne the






It is now possible to compute V . After some cumbersome, but straightforward computa-
tions, we obtain the following result.
Result 1

























From this result, one can derive the consumer's tenure choice conditions, with static expec-
tations, that is, on the assumption that a mortgage characterized by (r;m; T) will always
be available in the future. These tenure choice conditions are in fact equivalent to the bor-
rower's participation constraint, from the point of view of the banker. De¯ne V r(½;w;®)
as the expected utility of a consumer who rents a house forever. Clearly, with the help of
(9), one easily checks that











Now, consumer ® will accept a loan (r; m;T;0) at time 0 if and only if, for all T¤ ¸ 0,
V (0;T;®) ¸ V (T¤;T;®): (11)
This condition has a remarkably simple equivalent formulation.
10Result 2
C o n d i t i o n( 1 1 )i se q u i v a l e n tt o
V (0;T;®) ¸ V r(½;w;®): (12)
To prove this result, it is su±cient to show that V is decreasing with respect to T¤,i fa n d
only if condition (12) holds.
From now on, and to clarify notation, we denote
¹ V (c;h;T;®)=V (0;T;®); (13)
letting c and h explicitly appear as arguments of the expected utility. Parameter ® must
be viewed as a vector of characteristics including µ, w, a, ±.
3.2. The lender
We now construct the bank's expected pro¯t function from a mortgage loan to a borrower
of type ®,s t a r t i n ga tt i m eT¤ = 0. From now on, the reader must understand that all
mortgages start at date T¤ =0 .
We assume that the bank's liability structure can be modelled as if it sold bonds or
certi¯cates of deposit in exchange for an interest rate denoted i to ¯nance its loans. The
bank is also assumed to avoid any form of interest rate or re¯nancing risk. The timing
of payments on its debt, interest and principal, matches the timing of revenues from its
mortgage portfolio (amortization schedules are parallel). The loans are not securitized, and
kept on the asset side of the bank's balance sheet (this assumption corresponds to common
French practice). The interest rate i is used to discount the bank's future cash °ows. If a
client defaults at date t¤, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that the liquidation value
of the house is zero. More realistic representations of mortgage foreclosure lead to very
complex nonlinear expressions of expected pro¯t, and happened to be intractable with the
kind of data that we have.
With our simplifying assumptions, the date 0 net present value of a loan, conditional










b(t¤)dt¤ + e¡µTb(T): (15)





11Given (16), the zero-pro¯t condition ¦(c;h;T;®)=0w r i t e s
p = p(µ + i;T); (17)
meaning that interest rates charged can be expressed as i plus a risk-premium µ, in com-
petitive equilibrium.











which is linear with respect to (c;h). The banker's marginal rate of substitution between









3.3. Competitive equilibrium in mortgage contracts
We assume here, (i), that a large number of banks compete to supply loans to con-
sumers, and (ii), that a consumer's type ® is observable by every bank. Banks "com-
pete in contracts". For given T, the banker who o®ers the most advantageous contract
(c(T;®);h(T;®);T) will attract all the clients of type ®. It follows that competition
will drive pro¯ts to zero for each pair (T;®): Formally, in equilibrium, if the contract
(c(T;®);h(T;®);T)i st r a d e d ,¦ [ c(T;®);h(T;®);T;®] = 0. In addition, each contract












for otherwise, a competitor could o®er a more advantageous contract to consumers of type
®,g i v e nT.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
The competitive equilibrium is represented on ¯gure 1(a). For any given T, the equilibrium
contract (c¤;h ¤)=( c(T;®);h(T;®)) simply maximizes ¹ V (c;h;T;®) under the zero-pro¯t
constraint ¦[c;h;T;®] = 0, which is linear here.
123.4. The discriminating monopolist's menu of contracts
If banks are endowed with a form of market power, due to concentration in the mortgage
lending sector, or due to the fact that competitors consistently reject the applications of
some consumer types, then, a more appropriate model will be that of a ¯rst-degree dis-
criminating monopolist. Perfect discrimination requires that, for each type pair (T;®), for
which trade occurs, the contract (c(T;®);h(T;®);T) should maximize ¦(c;h;T;®)s u b j e c t
to the borrower's participation constraint (12), for given T. The necessary condition for
optimality (20) will then again be satis¯ed for all (T;®). But the zero-pro¯t condition
should be replaced by the zero-surplus condition,
¹ V (c(T;®);h(T;®);T;®)=V r(½;w;®); (21)
which says that the entire consumer surplus is extracted by the monopolist. This situation
is represented on ¯gure 1(b): for each (T;®), the monopolist maximizes pro¯t ¦, with
respect to (c;h), subject to the constraint that ¹ V (c;h;T;®) ¸ V r(½;w;®). Expected
pro¯t is decreasing with respect to c and h: the bankers always prefer to reduce house
size h (lend less) for a ¯xed reimbursement °ow pm, and they always prefer to increase
the rate, that is, reduce consumption c, for a given loan size m. The optimal contract is
therefore located on the lowest iso-pro¯t line compatible with borrower participation.
4. Estimation of the models
We will ¯rst propose a way of estimating the competitive model described above, and
discuss the possibilities of testing for the presence of discrimination. We then present
some estimation results. The same job will be done with the discriminating monopolist
model.
4.1. Speci¯cation and estimation of the competitive model
In order to obtain a reasonably tractable formulation we assume that the instantaneous
utility u is quasi-linear, with the particular parametric form,




where ° is a function of individual characteristics and ², an individual preference parameter.





with 0 <²<1, can be interpreted as the "price-elasticity of the demand for housing", as
will be shown below. With the above speci¯cation of u,u s i n g( 9 )w i t hT¤ =0 ,o n eg e t s ,















13From (23), it is easy to compute the marginal rate of substitution of a borrower,
@ ¹ V= @c










1 ¡ e¡(µ+±)T : (25)
Remark that if the borrower becomes very impatient, then lim±!+1K(µ;±;T)=1a n di f
the borrower becomes extremely patient, lim±!0K(µ;±;T)=+ 1.







Using then the change of variable h =( m + a)=¼ and taking logs yields the expression,
log(m + a)=¯log(°)+( 1¡ ¯)log(¼)+¯log[K] ¡ ¯log[p(µ + i;T)]: (27)
Remark that (27) is very close to being a simple "demand for housing", in the expression
of which p(µ + i;T)p l a y st h er o l eo fah o u s i n gp r i c e .
Recall that the zero-pro¯t condition (17) writes p = p(µ + i;T). If we assume that
both equations (27) and (17) are satis¯ed up to a random error term, (27) and (17) become
a bivariate nonlinear system.
Econometric speci¯cation
For the purpose of estimation, our bivariate model (17)-(27) should be fully speci¯ed. We
consider (a;w;T) as exogenous variables. The discrete variable T c o u l di np r i n c i p l eb e
treated as endogenous, but this would lead us to a much more complicated model with
three endogenous variables, and the equation determining T would be very di±cult to
estimate. In addition the empirical distribution of T is very much concentrated on 10, 15
and 20 years (see ¯gure 9). This is why we treat T as exogenous. In addition, there are
other exogenous observations on the households, such as family size, age, and occupational
status, that can be used to explain di®erences in preferences for housing and default risk.
Let X denote the vector of all exogenous variables, including, a, w, ¼, T and i.T h ev e c t o r
(¯;°;±;µ) fully characterizes a consumer. A possibility is then to assume that °, ¯ and µ
are themselves functions of X, and to specify functional forms °(X), µ(X)a n d¯(X), with
parameters to be estimated (± could also, in principle, be speci¯ed that way).
We have been able to estimate a somewhat simpli¯ed version of (17)-(27). To limit the
n u m b e ro fp a r a m e t e r s ,w eh a v es e tK = 1: this is tantamount to assuming that consumers
are very impatient5. We obtain the following model.
log(m + a)=¯(X)log(°(X)) + (1 ¡ ¯(X))log(¼) ¡ ¯(X)log[p(µ(X)+i;T)] + e1; (28)
log(p)=log[p(µ(X)+i;T)] + e2: (29)
5 An estimate of ± has been obtained in a variant of the monopoly model (see the appendix).
14The perturbation vector e =( e1;e 2) is assumed normally distributed with mean zero
and covariance matrix ­. Of course, in the above equation, it must be understood that
p = p(r;T)( R e c a l lt h a tr and T are observed). The endogenous variables are simply
log(m+a), the logarithm of the total house price (in euros), and log(p), the logarithm of the
continuous-time constant reimbursement annuity. The function log(°(X)) is simply taken
to be a linear function of the constant, log(w), the age of the borrower (in logarithms),
and family size (in logarithms). Parameter ¯ varies with occupational status dummies
only (white collar, intermediate professions and executives), blue-collar workers being the
reference group. Let Exec, Interm, Whitecol, Bluecol respectively denote the executive,
intermediate profession, white collar and blue collar dummies. Finally, µ is speci¯ed as
follows:






a speci¯cation in which the wage (in logs) interacts with occupational status. The model
has been estimated by the maximum likelihood method. It is less simple than it seems,
since (m + a)a p p e a r si nµ(X) and is endogenous; this gives rise to complicated Jacobian
terms in the expression of likelihood. The price of houses ¼ has been calibrated: we set
its value at 428 euros per square meter (this corresponds roughly to $45 per square foot),
a reasonable ¯gure for the French provinces.
Estimation results
The results are presented in Table 2. All parameters are signi¯cant, except the white-collar
dummy in ¯(X), the intermediate-professions-wage interaction variable in µ(X), and family
size in °(X). This means that the ¯ parameter of white collars is not signi¯cantly di®erent
from that of blue collars, and that the wage's e®ect on the intermediate professions' risk
premium is not signi¯cantly di®erent from the same e®ect on the blue-collars' risk premium.
All parameter estimates also have the expected sign. We will concentrate our comments
on ¯ and on the estimated risk premium function.
Remark ¯rst that the "price-elasticity of demand for housing" ¯ varies signi¯cantly
with occupational status: For executives, ¯ =2 :1766; for intermediate professions ¯ =
2:1475; for white collars ¯ =2 :1231; and for blue collars, we ¯nd ¯ =2 :1166. That is,
the lower in the professional hierarchy, the less elastic6.S e c o n d ,t h ee s t i m a t e dµ exhibits
"social discrimination". Workers are clearly discriminated against, just because they are
workers, not simply because their wage is low. A negative coe±cient on the wage in the µ
function, which varies with the occupational status, means that the way the wage is taken
into account to assess default risk depends on the status. According to the banker, the
richest are the less risky. Yet, the extent of the interest rate reduction which is granted for
a given increase in the wage is higher, the higher the status. At the same time, the inverse
of the downpayment ratio has a positive coe±cient, as expected. The number of variables
6 The reader could have expected the reverse ranking: we provide an explanation below for this result.
15introduced in the risk-premium function is too small to guarantee that the estimates re°ect
prejudice against the working class (or a favorable prejudice for executives). The observed
discrimination could be a form of statistical discrimination, that is, the occupational status
variables are likely to act as proxy variables for unobserved factors correlated with default
risk (see the discussion in section 5 below).
The presence of market power
The mean value of µ in the blue-collar category is µ(Bluecol)=0 :0398; it is µ(Whitecol)=
0:0425 for white-collars; µ(Interm)=0 :0367 for intermediate professions, and µ(Exec)=
0:0330 for executives, the di®erences being signi¯cant, except for the intermediates. But the
order of magnitude of these risk-premia is too high. Since the probability of default before
term is F(T)=1¡ e¡µT, we can estimate F(15) and the ¯gures are 0:464, 0:469, 0:380
and 0:350 for the blue collars, white collars, intermediates and executives, respectively.
These probabilities of default do not correspond to what is known ap r i o r ion mortgage
default rates in France. A reasonable ¯gure would be something like 3%, not 35% or
46%! The chief executives of the CHF claim that their network does a very good screening
job and that F(15) ¼ 0:01. This is a su±cient indication for the presence of market
power: the values of µ should be interpreted as markups, not as risk-premia. The fact that
these markups are inversely related with the corresponding price-elasticities of demand for
housing, the ¯s, is an indication that price discrimination is taking place. Workers are
less elastic than executives, they therefore pay more in (monopolistic) equilibrium. This
is why we estimate a monopolistic version of the model in the next subsection.
Figures 2 to 4 represent numerical simulations of the model with the estimated pa-
rameters. Figures 2 and 3 depict the interest rate charged on borrowers as a function of
the wage and of the downpayment ratio, respectively. To draw these ¯gures, the values
of exogenous variables are set equal to their overall sample mean, with the exception of
the variable appearing on the x-axis. The schedules show striking di®erences of treatment
between social categories, everything else being equal. The mere fact of being an executive
leads to a reduction of the interest rate of approximately half a percentage point, relative
to white collars. Figure 4 shows the house size schedule as a function of the wage. The
same type of social discrimination appears clearly.
4.2. The Monopoly Model
To establish the equations of the monopoly model, it is su±cient to replace the zero-pro¯t
condition (17) with the zero-surplus condition (21). In order to obtain the analytical
expression of (21), we ¯rst compute V r, the indirect utility of a household on the rental
market. The rental demand for housing is obtained by maximizing u(c;h), as speci¯ed by
(22) above, with respect to (c;h), under the budget constraint c + ½h = w,w h e r e½ is the
rent per square meter. This easily yields the instantaneous indirect utility of renting,












Now, we equate ¹ V ,g i v e nb y( 2 3 ) ,w i t hV r, to obtain the analytical form of (21), and






(¯ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ e¡(µ+±)T)
: (33)
Note that u0 has disappeared from (33). The model to be estimated is (27) and (33). As
before, we set ± =+ 1,a n dt h u sK = 1 (see the appendix, for an estimation of ±), and
get the following bivariate model.












where e1 and e2 are zero-mean random error terms, with a normal distribution, y1 =
log(m + a)a n dy2 = pm are the endogenous variables, and X is the vector of exogenous
variables. Of course, p = p(r;T). The speci¯cations of °(X)a n dµ(X)a r ee x a c t l yt h e
same as before (µ being de¯ned by (30); ° being a loglinear function of the constant, w,
age and family size). For this estimation, we set ¯(X)=exp[b0+b1(Exec)+b2(Interm)+
b3(Whitecol)]. The price of a square meter and the yearly rent per square meter are
calibrated at reasonable values, respectively ¼ = 428 and ½ = 46, in euros.
The model is again estimated by standard maximum likelihood. Estimation results
are summarized by Table 3. All coe±cients are signi¯cant, except the coe±cients of the
intermediate professions dummy in ¯, of family size and age in °,a n do ft h e( w h i t e -
collar)(wage) interaction variable in µ. It follows that "social discrimination" is present,
since wage-status interaction terms are signi¯cant for executives and intermediate profes-
sions in the risk-premium function µ.
Again, the values of ¯ can be ranked according to occupational status, estimated
values being ¯ =1 :6117 for blue collars, ¯ =1 :6002 for white collars, and ¯ =1 :6308
for executives. The estimated mean values of µ for each occupational status reveal the
expected ranking of risk premia, from the lowest, the executives, to the highest, the white
and blue collars (see bottom of Table 3). These estimates of µ c o r r e s p o n dt om u c hm o r e
reasonable probabilities of default than the competitive estimates obtained above. Com-
puting F(15) = 1 ¡ e¡15¹ µ with the estimated average values of the risk premium, ¹ µ,i n
each category, yields F = :169 for blue collars, F = :119 for white collars, F = :055 for
intermediates and F = :018 for executives: the expected ranking.
We conclude that housing demand elasticities (i.e.,t h e¯s) are overestimated by the
competitive model, because risk-premia are also overestimated. Since equation (29) (i.e.,
the competitive pricing equation) is likely to be an incorrect representation, upward biased
17risk-premia are transformed into upward biased housing demand elasticities while estimat-
ing equation (28) (i.e., the house size equation) simultaneously with (29). We probably
get better estimates of structural parameters with the monopoly version of the model, in
spite of the added complexity of the zero-surplus equation (35).
We conclude that workers seem to be discriminated against by the bank, the origin of
the discrimination being mostly due to di®ering elasticities of demand, and secondarily to
di®erences in perceived default risks. These di®erences in elasticities ¯ could simply capture
the fact that blue-collar workers are more likely to see their loan applications rejected by
other commercial banks, since the CHF is specialized in "social loans." Nevertheless, the
results show that consumer heterogeneity is exploited by the banker to make more pro¯t,
as illustrated by the simulations. Figures 5 to 8 represent numerical simulations of the
model with estimated values of the parameters. Figures 5 to 7 illustrate the same kind of
phenomena as Figures 2 to 4, but under the assumption of monopolistic behavior. Figure
8 represents the estimated reservation utility or participation levels of the social categories,
as de¯ned by (21) above, in the form of indi®erence curves. It is easy to see that executives
consume more than the workers for any given size of the house. To compute each of these
indi®erence curves, we used the sample mean values of the exogenous variables, except for
the wage, the mean of which is evaluated in each occupational status sub-sample. In the
appendix, we propose a variant of the monopoly model, in which the impatience parameter
±, and function K,a r ee s t i m a t e d .
5. Further remarks on racial discrimination in credit markets
Discrimination in credit markets has recently attracted considerable attention, and the
question of deciding whether or not | and why | lenders discriminate against minority
groups is a hotly debated topic among economists. The importance of the question is
ampli¯ed by the fact that racial discrimination in mortgage lending has been made illegal
by the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, in the United States, and by the availability
of new data sources, allowing for new econometric tests. The recent literature on this
question is mostly empirical, and concentrated on racial or sexual discrimination problems.
Empirical studies of discrimination in mortgage lending have developed with the debate
triggered by the contributions of Shafer and Ladd (1981) and Munnell et al. (1996).
Several other important contributions to this literature are commented in Ladd's (1998)
survey article.
A di±cult problem in most empirical studies is to detect the presence of discrimination
in the sense of G. Becker (1957). More precisely, a lender, or seller, is said to discriminate
in the sense of Becker, if she is ready to forego pro¯ts just because of her prejudices. This
form of discrimination is based on a particular "taste for discrimination" of the sellers, and
is not usually considered by standard I.O. theories of price discrimination.
In contrast, a lender might treat a minority group di®erently, because racial or eth-
nic characteristics are correlated with some variables, important in the determination of
creditworthiness and default risk, and which remain unobserved. This latter form of be-
havior is called statistical discrimination in the sense of Arrow (1973) and Phelps (1972).
An important di±culty stems from the fact that econometricians can never be sure of
having introduced enough explanatory variables to control for possible risk di®erences in
18their estimation of default probabilities. It follows that a signi¯cant coe±cient on race in
regressions could only indicate that statistical discrimination is taking place.
Another di±culty is the need to separate the e®ect of risk from that of market power
in the formation of interest rates. On the role of concentration in the explanation of
interest rates, see Cavaluzzo and Cavaluzzo (1998). On the empirical relationship between
concentration and discrimination, see Berkovec et al. (1998). The risk premium charged
on some borrowers can also be interpreted as a standard monopolistic markup. To be more
precise, it might be that the borrowers' preference parameters are correlated with their
social, racial or ethnic group, because individual preferences depend on a group's particular
economic conditions. Then, if market power is present, standard price discrimination can
in turn become the explanation for di®erential treatment, without necessarily re°ecting the
presence of prejudice. This type of approach, however, is not without its dangers, which
would be to attribute the bulk of observed di®erences in treatment to taste di®erences
c o r r e l a t e dw i t hr a c e .H o w e v e r ,c o m p e t i t i o ns h o u l dt e n dt oe l i m i n a t ed i s c r i m i n a t i o ni nt h e
sense of Becker, since prejudiced lenders would lose business in favor of the unprejudiced.
It follows that market power and discrimination in this sense must be closely interrelated.
In the results presented above, it is very likely that the preference di®erences be-
tween occupational status groups, i.e., the di®erences in parameter ¯, re°ect the di®ering
bargaining strengths of the borrowers, or the di®ering probabilities of obtaining a loan
elsewhere, blue collars being more or less a captive clientele of the CHF.
Finally, the most di±cult problem in detecting the presence of prejudice is that dis-
crimination in the market for mortgages might re°ect the existence of discrimination in
other markets, such as the labour and housing markets, and thus be purely statistical in
nature. Some minority groups would pay higher mortgage rates because they have higher
probabilities of losing their jobs, and this, in turn, could simply be a consequence of their
employer's behavior.
Much of the published work on discrimination in the mortgage market, to the best
of our knowledge, has been devoted to the study of default and of credit denial rates
(again see H. Ladd (1998)). In contrast, the model presented above aims at explaining
the structure of accepted loan applications and determines loan sizes and interest rates
simultaneously. This model could be used to test for the presence of discrimination in
the sense of Becker, paying attention to the role of local market conditions, of preference
heterogeneity and of di®ering default risks. In theory, the model allows one to separate, in
the interest rate and in loan size di®erences, what can be attributed to prejudice, from the
impact of di®erences in preferences and default risks. Variations in ¯, ° and ± can re°ect
di®ering preferences while µ re°ects default risk di®erences as perceived by the banker.
An observable characteristic can signi¯cantly change (¯;°;±), and thus lead to changes in
treatment by the banker.
If X contains enough information (enough control variables) to estimate a risk pre-
mium reasonably, the function µ(X) should not signi¯cantly depend on race. If it indeed
does depend on race signi¯cantly, then, discrimination in the sense of Becker is taking
place. Of course, if the information contained in X is not su±cient to control for di®er-
ences in riskiness, then, statistical discrimination in the sense of Arrow-Phelps can be the
explanation for a signi¯cant coe±cient on race in function µ.
19The model presented above allows for separation of these e®ects from plain discrim-
ination e®ects based on observable di®erences in preferences. There is a danger here,
however, which would be to attribute the bulk of di®erences in treatment to di®erences in
preferences: minority consumers would have relatively smaller or bad quality houses just
because they happen not to like nice housing! To avoid ambiguities of this type, it seems
to us that race should not be introduced as a variable in the speci¯cations of ¯, ° and ±.
6. Conclusion
To conclude, in the present contribution, we proposed a model of the mortgage lending
market. The model can be used to test for the presence of discrimination, using information
on accepted loan applications only. It rests on the idea of discrimination by the lender,
based on observable attributes of the borrower. It explains the interest rate and the loan
size of accepted loan applications simultaneously. We study a competitive equilibrium
variant and a discriminating monopolist variant of the model, in order to take phenomena
related to market power into account.
The model has been estimated with a sample of loan ¯les originating from branches of
a French mortgage lender. We reject the competitive model because estimated interest rate
markups are too high to re°ect default risks only. The monopolistic model gives a better
account of the discrimination phenomena at work in the data. We conclude that "social
discrimination" is present, in the sense that ceteris paribus, a member of the working class
would pay higher interest rates than an (equally rich) executive, just because he or she is
identi¯ed as a blue collar. Part of the di®erences in interest rates must be attributed to
observable di®erences in preferences, since blue-collar workers have a signi¯cantly smaller
price-elasticity of demand for housing than executives. The model also shows how borrower
characteristics and interest rates a®ect the size of granted loans.
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22Appendix. A Variant of the Monopoly Model
We also estimated a variant of the monopoly model, with a more parsimonious speci¯cation
of utility, that is,
u(c;h)=u0 + c + °log(h); (36)
but we tried to estimate the impatience parameter ±. With this speci¯cation, we ¯nd that
the instantaneous reservation utility of borrowers writes,
























e¡(±+µ)T + u0: (39)
Then, equating (39) with V r(½;w;®), using (37), yields the speci¯c form of the zero-surplus
condition (21), that is, after some computations,
(c ¡ w)(1 ¡ e
¡(±+µ)T)+°log(h)(1 + (µ=±)e
¡(±+µ)T)=°[log(°=½) ¡ 1]: (40)
The system to be estimated is (38) and (40), with c ¡ w = ¡pm and h =( m + a)=¼.
Taking logs on both sides of (38), we ¯nd the system,









where e1 and e2 are zero-mean random error terms, with a normal distribution, y1 =
log(m + a)a n dy2 = pm are the endogenous variables, and X are exogenous variables.
We assume that for each individual j, µ can be expressed as µj = ¡(1=Tj)log(1 ¡ F)
where F is a common probability of default. The parameters to estimate are D = log(±),
F, ½ and the parameters of function °, which is speci¯ed as follows,
log(°(X)) = °0 + °1log(w)+°2log(age)+°3log(T)
+°4(Exec)+°5(Interm)+°6(Whitecol): (43)
23This model was di±cult to estimate. We estimated ± = eD and the °s by standard
maximum likelihood for ¯xed ½ and F, and then estimated ½ and F by a grid-search
procedure. The results are presented in Table 4. All the ° parameters are signi¯cantly
di®erent from zero, except the coe±cient on the white-collar dummy, meaning that white
collars can be merged with the blue collars. The estimated value of ± is 0:158, a reasonable
¯gure. Given that we assume liquidity constrained borrowers, they must be impatient
enough to be willing to borrow, so that it is reassuring to ¯nd ± above the maximal
interest rates in the sample. The estimated rent ½, which is FFrancs 294 per square meter
and per year is also reasonable, given that our observations are outside the very expensive
Paris area (this makes a rent of $4.41 per square foot and per year, or an approximate
monthly rent of $202 for a two-rooms °at of 550 square feet). Finally, the estimated value
of F is 0:011, very close to the expected 1% value. This, again, corresponds to a much more
realistic average estimated value, ¹ µ =0 :00073, than those obtained with the competitive
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Table 2 . Competitive Model 
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Mean of Theta for 
- Executive.................................... 0.00126 
- Intermediate................................ 0.00382 
- White Collar............................... 0.00852 




- White Collar........................1.6002 
- Blue Collar..........................1.6117 
 
Mean Log-Likelihood........... L = -1.90688 
 









0899 . 1 1477 . 0
1477 . 0 2125 . 0
 
matrix of errors 
 
Correlation Coefficient...............= -0.3070 
Number of observations ........N=2610 
 
 
Empirical variance of  
- Log(m+a) ......................Var=0.2958 
- pm..................................Var=2.5141 
  
Table 4 . Variant of Monopoly Model 
 
 










































Prob. of Default = 0.011 
Mean of Theta = 0.00073 
Delta                = 0.1581 
Rent = ρ = 294.4 FF (44.95 euros) 
Price of square meter = π = 2800 FF  
   (427.48 euros) 
 
 
Mean Log-Likelihood........... L = -1.89102 
 









9725 . 0 2276 . 0
2276 . 0 2080 . 0
 
matrix of errors 
 
Correlation Coefficient.  = -0.5059 
 
Number of observations........N=2610 
 
 
Empirical variance of  
- Log(m+a)......................Var=0.2958 
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